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Abstract This article makes the case that our digital devices create illusions of agency. There are times
when users feel as if they are in control when in fact
they are merely responding to stimuli on the screen in
predictable ways. After the introduction, the second
section of the article offers examples of illusions of
agency that do not involve human–computer interaction in order to show that such illusions are possible
and not terribly uncommon. The third and fourth sections of the article cover relevant work from empirical psychology, including the cues that are known to
generate the sense of agency. The fifth section of the
article shows that our devices are designed to deliver
precisely those cues. In the sixth section, the argument is completed with evidence that users frequently
use their smartphones without the sort of intentional
supervision involved in genuine agency. This sixth
section includes the introduction of Digital Environmental Dependency Syndrome (DEDS) as a possible
way of characterizing extended use of the smartphone
without genuine agency. In the final section of the
article, there is a discussion of questions raised by the
main claim, including suggestions for reducing occurrences of illusions of agency through software design.
Keywords illusion of agency · sense of agency ·
smartphone · comparator model · user interface ·
human-computer interaction
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Introduction
The sense of agency refers to the feeling we have of
being in control of our deliberate actions. We have it
when we perform deliberate actions, and we do not
have it when we generate movements that are not
deliberate, such as reflexes or twitches. The sense of
agency is surprisingly fragile; it is not always a reliable guide to whether our actions harmonize with our
intentions. There are a range of conditions in which
the sense of agency arises when it should not, as
well as conditions in which it does not arise when it
should. The main claim of this article is that the operating systems, apps, and input hardware on our electronic devices create conditions in which the sense
of agency is likely to accompany actions that are not
genuinely intentional. In other words, there are times
that we feel as if we are in control of our clicks and
our swipes, when in fact we are not. Rather than being
in control, we are automatically reacting to stimuli in
more or less predictable ways. Considering the time
increasingly spent interacting with our devices (10 h a
day, not including work, on one estimate1) along with
the range of real-world actions that we can perform
using them, my thesis may have implications for the
future of human autonomy.
Before beginning, I’d like to situate this article in the
larger context. In her recent book, Shoshana Zuboff [1]
demonstrates that the overall goal of those with power
in Silicon Valley is to predict human behavior on a
large scale by manipulating individual human behavior.
She calls for mass social change in order to prevent a
1

https://www.nielsen.com/us/en/insights/report/2016/t he-
total-audience-report-q1-2016/
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scenario in which the general public is being controlled
by a few corporations wielding tremendous power.
But there is at least one understandable reason why
someone might not worry about Zuboff’s thesis and
instead complacently go along with the status quo. The
reason is as follows: it does not usually feel to us as if we
are being manipulated through our devices. The best reply
to this kind of complacency is a main message of this
article, the message that subjective feeling is not always a
reliable guide to the causes of our actions. It is possible to
feel as if we are in control despite the fact that we are not.
Zuboff makes the case that the theoretical foundation of Silicon Valley’s behavior modification project
are the behaviorist techniques of B. F. Skinner with
superficial alterations [1]: chapter 12, [2]. Her message is powerful because those techniques, such as
conditioning and nudging, are effective. Contemporary work in psychology has moved beyond the behaviorist paradigm and offers additional insight into the
causal factors at play during intentional action. This
recent work, presented below, identifies the conditions
under which we are most likely to have an illusion of
agency, to feel control over an action that is automatically triggered by the environment. Screens on mobile
devices create precisely those conditions.
Here is an outline of the article. In the following section, I make the case that the sense of agency
is fragile by using examples that show illusions of
agency occurring under both pathological and nonpathological conditions. These examples raise two
questions. The first question is: what are the causal
mechanisms at play during intentional action? I
answer this question in the section below titled "The
Supervisory-Inhibition Model of Action." The second
question is: how is the sense of agency generated? I
answer this question in "Two Mechanisms for Generating the Sense of Agency" by presenting the two cues
involved in generating the sense of agency. The first
cue is predictability and the second cue is fluency. In
the fifth section of the article I turn to existing guidelines for user interface (UI) design. Those guidelines
explicitly encourage designers to create apps that are
predictable and fluent, apps that cue for the sense of
agency. In the sixth section of the article, I present evidence suggesting that many users engage their smartphones without the sort of intentional supervision
required for genuine agency. Such patterns of engagement are likely accompanied by an illusory sense of
agency. There I introduce the new concept of Digital
Vol:. (1234567890)
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Environmental Dependency Syndrome (DEDS) as
a possible way of characterizing extended use of
the smartphone without genuine (but with illusory)
agency. In the final, the seventh section of the article, I offer reasons and strategies for addressing illusions of agency in human–computer interaction. There
I suggest ways that future research might inform the
design of apps that reduce the likelihood of illusions
of agency.

Illusions of Agency
In the preceding section, I made the claim that the
sense of agency is fragile. Here are some examples of
scenarios in which the sense of agency does not arise
as it should. I will begin with the pathological cases
and then present some of the scenarios that induce
non-pathological illusions of agency.
Pathological Disorders of Agency
a) Schizophrenia
A common symptom of schizophrenia is to have delusions of control. Patients perform actions, but do not
have a sense of agency for those actions. As a result,
they form the false belief that someone or something
is controlling them [3, 4].
b) Depersonalization Disorder
One symptom of this disorder is a loss of the sense of
agency for self-generated actions. Unlike schizophrenics, individuals suffering from depersonalization do
not form false beliefs about the causes of their actions.
That is, they maintain the true belief that they are controlling their own bodily movements, but report losing
the feeling as if they are in control. They might report
feeling as if they are a robot or an automaton [5–7].
c) Anarchic Hand Syndrome
This condition involves complex goal-directed actions
of an upper limb that are not intentional and may even
conflict with the intentions of the patient. Patients cannot inhibit these actions and feel no sense of agency
for them [8, 9].
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d) Utilization Behavior
When objects are presented to patients with this disorder, the patients grasp and use the objects, even when
it is socially inappropriate to do so and even when
they are explicitly instructed not to do so [10, 11]. For
example, one patient was presented with one pair of
eyeglasses after another and put all three pairs on his
face, one on top of the next. The patients seem to have
a sense of agency for these actions. When asked why
they perform the actions that are triggered by objects
in the environment, they give vague responses, claiming that they believed the examiner wanted them to
perform those actions: “ʻYou held them out to me, I
thought I had to use them’” ([11]: 251).
e) Imitation Behavior
This disorder is similar to Utilization Behavior in that
patients seem to reply automatically to a feature of
the environment. Instead of responding to artifacts,
patients with Imitation Behavior will imitate the gestures of the examiner. Again, patients seem to have a
sense of agency. They report thinking that they were
supposed to imitate [12–14].
f) Environmental Dependency Syndrome
This syndrome describes behavior that occurs when
Utilization and Imitation behavior combine such that
the patients spontaneously play a role solicited by
their environmental context. This syndrome refers to
complex behavior, while the previous two disorders
refer to simple actions [13, 14]. For example, when
presented with medical equipment, one patient started
playing the role of a physician, taking blood pressure
and so on. Two patients were brought into a room
with a buffet and about 20 other people. The patient
from the higher social background immediately
started behaving as a guest, while the patient from the
more modest social background started behaving as a
hostess. As above, the patients seem to have a sense
of agency, reporting that they felt a duty to respond as
they did to the environment. Overall, the behavior of
these patients seem to be entirely driven by the environment, as they exhibit “mental inertia and apathy”
when not stimulated by environmental affordances
([13, 14]: 342). In a more recent case study, a patient
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was taken to the hospital bar and began to take orders
for drinks, claiming that he was on a “two-week trial”
for the job of bartender. The same patient claimed
(falsely) to be a chef in charge of preparing special
dishes for patients when taken to the hospital kitchen
[73].
The final three disorders listed above are all associated with frontal lobe damage. Among the pathological cases, they are perhaps the most relevant for the
topic of this article. One main goal here is to raise
the serious possibility that our electronic devices
can cause a kind of Digital Environmental Dependency Syndrome (DEDS). I will return to this possibility in "No Supervision" and "Consequences and
Solutions" below.
Non‑pathological Illusions of Agency
a) Ideomotor Actions
In the nineteenth century, there was great interest in a
variety of purportedly supernatural phenomena such
as table turning, divination using a rod (also known
as dowsing), and planchette writing (as in a Ouija
board). William Carpenter [15, 16] introduced the
ideomotor theory of action as a naturalistic explanation for these phenomena. According to this theory,
merely thinking about an action can cause one to perform it. If the conditions are right (such as during a
Ouija board séance), we can perform actions without
having a sense of agency for those actions. Ideomotor
actions have been observed under experimental conditions [17, 18], references and discussion found in
([19]: chapter 4).
b) Developmental Illusions of Agency
A number of different experiments have found that
children under the age of 5 can have difficulty distinguishing whether or not the actions that they perform
are intentional. Children of 3 and 4 years claim that
they have acted intentionally for reflex movements and
for passive movements in which the arm is moved by
the experimenter [20–22]. Another study gave 4 year
old children the task of distinguishing voluntary from
involuntary action in a video. The children responded
incorrectly that all of the actions were voluntary [23].
Vol.: (0123456789)
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c) The “I Spy” Scenario
This classic experiment involves a square wooden
board attached to the top of a computer mouse. The
subject and a confederate place their hands on the
board, as one does with the planchette of a Ouija
board, in order to control the cursor on a screen visible next to them. The screen has images of lots of
small objects and both participants are instructed to
move the cursor and then stop it on an object after a
short interval. Both the subject and the confederate
wear headphones through which the subject hears
music and some words. The subject thinks that the
confederate also hears music and words, but in fact
the confederate only hears instructions from the
experimenter. These conditions generate an illusion
of agency in the subject by playing words through the
headphones of the subject shortly before the confederate stops the cursor on the object whose name the
subject hears. For example, the subject may hear the
word “swan” right before the confederate stops the
cursor on the swan. Subjects falsely report that stopping the cursor on the image of a swan was what they
intended even though the location of the stop was
determined by the confederate [24].
d) Human Error
In his fascinating study on the varieties of human
error, James Reason identifies a kind of error that
he refers to as “double-capture slips” ([25]: 68–71).
These errors involve “double” capture because attentional resources are captured as well as automatic
motor responses. Attentional resources are captured
by an internal thought or external distraction while
motor responses are captured by environmental affordances. Attentional supervision fails to inhibit automatic motor response. Here are some examples that
Reason takes from diary studies:
“We now have two fridges in our kitchen, and
yesterday we moved our food from one to the
other. This morning, I repeatedly opened the
fridge that we used to have our food in.”
“I intended to stop on the way to work to buy
some shoes, but ‘woke up’ to find that I had
driven right past.”
“I meant to take off my shoes, but took off my
socks as well.”
Vol:. (1234567890)
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“I was putting cutlery away in the drawer when
my wife asked me to leave it out, as she wanted
to use it. I heard her, but continued to put the
cutlery away.” ([25]: 70)
These examples demonstrate that non-pathological
(though erroneous) behavior can sometimes be driven
entirely by environmental affordances, just as in pathological cases of utilization behavior. Since no one
reported feelings of being externally controlled during
the error, the sense of agency seems to be present in
each of these cases even while the agent is not doing
what he or she intends to do. Thus, these everyday
cases of error provide additional examples of the illusion of agency. Since many readers can relate to these
examples, we might note that the illusion of agency
is not a rare occurrence. Also note that these examples fit especially well with the supervisory-inhibition
model of action covered in the following section.
The examples listed above all suggest that the
sense of agency is not always a reliable guide to the
causes behind an action. We can perform actions for
which we feel no sense of agency (Schizophrenia,
Depersonalization, Anarchic Hand Syndrome, ideomotor actions). Also, we can feel a sense of agency
for actions that we do not perform deliberately (developmental illusions), for actions that we do not perform at all (“I Spy”), and for actions that are automatically triggered by the environment (Utilization and
Imitation Behavior, and human error). The discrepancy between the sense of agency and the causes of
action lead to two distinct questions in the empirical
psychology of action. First, what are the causal mechanisms at play during intentional action? This question arises because we can no longer naively assume
that actions are simply caused by the agent’s intentions. Second, how is the sense of agency generated?
I will address the first question in "The SupervisoryInhibition Model of Action" and then turn to the second question in "Two Mechanisms for Generating the
Sense of Agency."
The Supervisory‑Inhibition Model of Action
Acting in the world requires a delicate balance
between responding to the affordances of the environment, on one hand, and striving towards goals that are
not immediately available, on the other. For example,
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in the middle of a fast-paced basketball game, the
skilled player must respond to the dynamics on the
court, to changing environmental affordances. In contrast, when reflecting in solitude on how to resolve a
complex social conflict among one’s peers, it is ideal
to turn one’s attention away from the immediate environment. This distinction between the temporally
immediate versus distant objects of intentional action
is well-known in the philosophical literature on the
topic [26, 27, 68]. Note that the distinction need not
rely on highly skillful activity. For example, mundane
activities such as dusting one’s house or navigating a
sidewalk can be described as more or less automatic
responses to the affordances of one’s environment.
In empirical psychology, some of the most influential models of the causal dynamics of intentional
action are based upon this distinction. According to
these models, which I will present below, we balance immediate environmental affordances against
long-term goals through the inhibition of action by
some supervisory mechanism. Perceiving environmental affordances activates the motor routines that
would enable us to act upon those affordances. Seeing a teacup activates the motor routine of grasping
the cup in the normal way. When things are going as
they should, we are able to inhibit the execution of
that motor routine if it would be inappropriate or otherwise undesirable to pick up the teacup.
An early version of the supervisory-inhibition model
can be found in William James, who cites Hermann
Lotze as an influence. Above, I introduced the explanation of purported supernatural phenomena by appeal to
ideomotor actions. In his treatment of the will, James
suggested that ideomotor actions are merely the “normal process [of acting] stripped of disguise” ([70]: 522).
What he means here is that the flow of thoughts in our
mental lives always naturally lead to the corresponding
action. When thoughts do not lead to the corresponding action, it is because they are inhibited, or, in James’
words, there is a “conflicting notion in the mind” (523).
More recent work has followed James’ general theme
while making adjustments to the model and incorporating additional empirical evidence. Donald Norman and
Tim Shallice [29] have developed a supervisory model
involving motor schema (also see [28]). Motor schemata
are neural representations that can be selected to control
action. The basic idea is that perceptual processing can
“trigger” motor schemata in order to initiate actions in
a more or less automatic fashion. Thus, our automatic
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actions are driven by what Norman and Shallice call the
horizontal thread of processing, which runs (roughly)
from perception, to triggering motor schemata, to action.
As already mentioned above, not all of our actions are
automatic in this way. Sometimes we have to resist the
urge to act upon environmental affordances. This fact
motivates Norman and Shallice to posit a supervisory
mechanism based in conscious attention. The role of
supervisory attention, on their model, is to increase or
decrease the activation values of competing motor schemata. Conscious attention can be modeled as a vertical
thread that serves as a sort of gatekeeper for the horizontal thread, enabling the appropriate motor schemata
to initiate action while inhibiting the inappropriate schemata from doing so (see Fig. 1).
The model by Norman and Shallice can account
for ideomotor actions in a straightforward manner
by appropriating the main idea from James. Recall
that James’ suggestion was that a “conflicting notion
in the mind” inhibits ideomotor actions from being
conducted. On the model by Norman and Shallice,
those conflicting notions are represented by vertical
conscious supervision of the horizontal processing
thread. Both models make use of inhibitory supervision, but a difference is that the more recent models
regard the mechanism of supervision to be supported
by activity in the frontal lobes. Norman and Shallice’s
model is designed to account for an impressive range
of empirical results, especially behavior associated
with frontal lobe damage.
Readers are referred to their work for the details,
but here are two examples. First, recall utilization
and imitation behavior and the related Environmental Dependency Syndrome from above. These types
of disorder are associated with frontal lobe damage
and seem to involve a deficit in the ability to supervise and inhibit motor schemata. A patient sees a tool,
or a gesture, or a social context, and these percepts
trigger the relevant motor schemata. Due to the brain
damage, which compromises the vertical supervisory
thread, the patient is unable to inhibit the triggered
actions and thereby behaves in the socially inappropriate ways described above.
Another example given above that can be addressed
by the Norman and Shallice model would be some types
of human error. Recall the examples of double capture
errors given above, such as the person who reported
intending to take off his shoes but takes off his socks as
well ([25]: 70). On the model under consideration, these
Vol.: (0123456789)

13

16

Page 6 of 15

Neuroethics

(2022) 15:16

Fig. 1  Norman and Shallice’s model of action involving vertical and horizontal processing threads (from [29])

errors occur when conscious supervision (the vertical
thread) fails to supervise adequately the actions that are
triggered along the horizontal thread. Norman and Shallice explain as follows: “a schema that controls an incorrect action could become more strongly activated... than
the correct schema and capture the effector systems. The
supervisory system, being directed elsewhere, would
not immediately monitor this, and a capture error would
result” ([29]: 12). This explanation fits nicely with the
evidence that capture errors tend to occur when individuals are distracted or preoccupied [25]. The supervisory
control mechanism is otherwise engaged and thereby
unable to inhibit the undesirable action. As one might
expect, frontal lobe damage is strongly associated with
deficiencies in error correction [30–32], all cited in [29].
In addition to James and Norman and Shallice,
various iterations of the supervisory inhibition model
receive approval from other influential contributions
to the literature. The idea of a supervisory system
based in the frontal lobes with the function of monitoring motor schemata, for example, is adopted in
Marc Jeannerod’s treatment of the fine-grained neurophysiology of action ([71]: Sect. 5.5). Chris Frith
et al. [33] have developed a comparator model of
action (see below) that appropriates key elements
Vol:. (1234567890)
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from Norman and Shallice. On their view, the supervisory inhibitory mechanism is associated with intention formation: “Responses to objects in the environment are normally inhibited until an intention has
been developed. The system that develops intentions
also inhibits inappropriate responses” ([33]: 1783).
Along with utilization behavior, Frith et al. model
aims to account for optic ataxia, anarchic hand, phantom limb, anosognosia, and delusions of control.2
Two Mechanisms for Generating the Sense
of Agency
Here is a review of the claims that I have introduced
so far. In the second section of the paper, I made
the case that the sense of agency is fragile. This fact

2

In addition to the models in psychology, there has been attention to these themes in philosophical work. See the pioneering
discussion of horizontal vs. vertical modularity in Hurley [34].
More recently, the explanation of skillful action in terms of
motor schemata has been integrated into the mainstream causal
theory of action, as in Clarke [35].
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immediately raises two questions about the nature of
intentional action. First, what are the causal mechanisms at play during intentional action? I have
answered this question in the previous section by
sketching the received view of action generation in
psychology and cognitive neuroscience. According to this view, which I have called the supervisoryinhibition model, perception of the environment automatically triggers motor schemata that control action
responses. Those responses are supervised and can be
inhibited by a conscious attentional mechanism that
seems to rely on functionality in the frontal lobes. Now
in this section we turn to the second question regarding
intentional action: how is the sense of agency generated? This question arises because, as demonstrated
above, it is not the case that the sense of agency arises
if and only if the action is genuinely intentional. We
can have agency for actions that are not intentional and
we can perform intentional actions without a sense of
agency. There must be some factor other than genuine
intention giving rise to the sense of agency.
In fact, several decades of research on the sense
of agency suggests that there are two different types
of factors or, more precisely, cues at play in the generation of the sense of agency. The first type of cue is
based on a comparison between the predicted sensory
outcome of an action, on one hand, and the actual
outcome, on the other. It is known as the comparator model. When there is a sufficient mismatch in the
comparison between the predicted outcome and the
actual outcome, there is no accompanying sense of
agency. The second type of cue has to do with the
mental states leading up to the action. When action
selection is fluent, or cognitively effortless, we seem
to have a greater sense of agency compared to cases
in which there is disfluency between the preceding
mental states and the selected action. Here is some of
the evidence in support of each type of cue.
The comparator model was not initially formulated
as an account of the sense of agency. Instead, it was
developed as an account of motor control [36] with
roots in cybernetics and control theory in engineering. There are different versions of the model with
variations in complexity, but here is the basic idea.
Every time a motor command is issued in order to
execute an action, there is also at the same time an
“efference copy” (also called a “corollary discharge”)
of the motor command generated and sent as input
to a forward model. The forward model predicts the
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sensory consequences of the action command. This
prediction brings a number of advantages in motor
control. One of the most important advantages is that
the prediction enables the system to make corrective
adjustments more quickly due to the fact that the forward model generates predictions (thereby detecting
the need for correction) faster than the sensorimotor
feedback from the actual movements of the limb.
A classic bit of evidence dates back to Hermann
von Helmholtz [37] who observed that gently moving
the position of the eye by using one’s fingers causes a
visual experience as if the entire visual scene shifts.
When we move our eyes using ocular muscles, the
forward model predicts the movement and the visual
world does not shift. When we move the eye with the
fingers, there is no such prediction.
A second line of evidence in support of the existence
of a forward model is the attenuation of self-generated
tactile sensations. In other words, touching oneself
tends to generate a weaker subjective sensation than
being touched by someone else with the same amount
of force [38, 39]. This phenomenon can be explained by
appeal to the forward model. The motor command, say,
to touch the back of one’s left hand with the fingers of
one’s right hand sends an efference copy of this command to the forward model. The forward model predicts the experience of a tactile sensation on the back
of the left hand and this prediction attenuates the sensation itself because the sensation is expected. When
someone else touches the back of one’s left hand, there
is no such prediction by a forward model and the sensation is surprising; it is not attenuated. This account can
be used to explain why we cannot tickle ourselves [66].
Interestingly, the attenuation of self-generated touch
does not occur in individuals with symptoms associated with schizophrenia, a disorder widely thought to
involve malfunction of the forward model [33, 40]. As
the theory would predict, schizophrenics are able to
tickle themselves [67].
The forward model makes sense as an obvious
cue in the generation of the sense of agency. A match
between internally predicted movement and actual
movement is a strong indicator that the movement is
self-generated. There has been a great deal of empirical research into the role of the forward model as a
cue for the sense of agency, with a standard paradigm
making use of a joystick [41] or finger motion controlling the movement of a symbol [42] or a virtual hand
on a computer screen [43]. The motion on the screen
Vol.: (0123456789)
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can correspond to the actual motor movement, or it can
deviate from the subject’s movement in various ways.
The motion on the screen can be temporally and spatially congruent with the action of the subject, it can
be systematically spatially distorted by, for instance,
an angular bias, or there can be some temporal delay.
Spatial and temporal distortion both reduce the sense
of agency for actions [44, 45].
The forward model accounts for the sense of
agency in these cases as follows. The motor command sent to the muscles to move the joystick (or
one’s finger) is accompanied by the efference copy
sent to the forward model which predicts the sensory outcome of the motor movement. The sensory
outcome is perceived as motion on the screen. When
the motion on the screen matches the anticipated outcome, subjects experience a sense of agency. When
there is incongruency between the anticipated outcome and the actual outcome on the screen, the sense
of agency is attenuated. Sufficient incongruency can
annihilate the sense of agency altogether as indicated
by the subject’s attributing the cause of the movement
to another agent [45]. The main conclusion that we
can draw from the comparator model is that the predictability of self-generated movements is a strong
cue for the sense of agency. When actions are predictable, there is a match between prediction and action
and this match underlies the sense of agency.
The comparator model is the best known account of
the sense of agency, but there is also evidence for another
type of cue involved. The comparator model provides
a cue for the sense of agency through proprioceptive
feedback, which, because it is feedback, must occur retrospectively after the motor movement is executed. The
other type of cue for the sense of agency occurs prospectively, prior to the motor movement itself. This other
type of model of agency is known as the action selection
model [46, 47]. Early support of prospective action selection cues can be found in Daniel Wegner’s interpretation
of his “I Spy” experiments [19, 24], mentioned in "Illusions of Agency" above. According to Wegner, the illusion of agency is generated in the “I Spy” scenario due
to the occurrence of a thought (due to auditory priming)
prior to the perception of the action effect. In order for
the thought to cue the sense of agency for the action, the
thought must have priority, consistency, and exclusivity.3
Priority means that the thought must occur prior to the
perceived action. Consistency means that the thought
must be consistent with the perceived action – the content
Vol:. (1234567890)
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of the thought must correspond with the object of the
action. Exclusivity means that there should be no other
apparent causes of the action. By altering experimental
conditions so that, for example, the priority condition is
not met due to the timing of the cue relative to the action,
the illusion of agency is lost [24]: 489.
More recent empirical studies have prompted
a refinement of these initial ideas about prospective action selection (see [49], for example). Valérian Chambon, Patrick Haggard, and colleagues
have developed an action selection model according
to which fluency or effortlessness of action is a cue
for the sense of agency (see [50] for a review). The
concept of fluency in cognition is a relatively new
and promising area of research in cognitive neuroscience. Examples of factors determining fluency might
include the font and contrast of the written word, phonetic and grammatical complexity, or the number of
factors involved in making a decision [51].
Fluency of action selection has been incorporated
into a number of studies with the use of unconscious
priming. Here is an example from Wenke et al. [47],
discussed in Chambon et al. [50]. The subject has the
task of pressing a left or a right button as instructed
by the display of an arrow pointing to the left or to
the right. After the button press, there is a random
delay and then a color appears on the display. The
subject is then asked to evaluate the degree of control
that they feel over the outcome of the color display.
The fluency or disfluency is generated by an unconscious prime displayed prior to the consciously perceived arrow. On some trials, the subject is shown an
unconscious prime that is compatible: an arrow that
points in the same direction as the consciously perceived arrow. On other trials the unconscious prime is
incompatible: an arrow pointing in the opposite direction from the consciously perceived arrow. Compatible primes are intended to generate fluency in action
selection, while incompatible primes are intended to
generate disfluency. As one might suspect, the feeling of control is higher with compatible primes and
lower for incompatible primes. Chambon et al. conclude: “Consistently, our findings suggest that people
may use the fluency (or ease) with which an action is
selected as a good advance predictor of actual statistical control over the external environment” ([50]: 7).
3

See Nahmias [48] for a critique of Wegner on this theme.
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In summarizing some of the main empirical
results on the sense of agency, Chambon et al.
make two general points relevant to our purposes
here. First, they claim that the sense of agency is
likely generated according to various cues, and
that “Bayesian models of cue integration might
be able to encompass these dynamic changes in
cue weight” (ibid.). Second, they propose that the
“results overall support the idea that agency is
the ‘default’ assumption, which is only falsified,
or reduced, when there is ‘sufficient’ evidence
against it” (ibid., also see [23] for an early expression of this idea). I mention these two points here
in order to illustrate the gap between our intuitive,
pre-scientific conception of agency, on one hand,
and the way in which agency is understood in cognitive neuroscience, on the other. While our intuitive conception naturally treats agency as a trustworthy guide to intentional action, the picture we
receive here is quite different. On the picture here,
the mind, or brain, must continuously “decide”
whether to generate the sense of agency for bodily
movements based on cues that are weighted probabilistically. Importantly, if Chambon et al. are correct that the “decision” to generate the sense of
agency is the default assumption, then it is most
reasonable to think that it may not be difficult to
create conditions that generate a false sense of
agency, to maximize the likelihood of the brain
making the default assumption. Now I will demonstrate that our electronic devices are designed to
create those conditions.
Agency by Design
In over two decades of empirical studies, researchers
have identified two kinds of cues that generate the sense
of agency: predictability and fluency. In the guidelines
from both Apple and Microsoft for the design of the
user interface (UI) for apps, presented below, both companies emphasize that the UI should feature two properties: predictability and fluency. These two companies
explicitly advise creators to design apps according to
the principles that are known to cue the sense of agency.
Here are some of the relevant passages taken from
the UI design guidelines from the two technology
giants. Begin with Apple:
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An app can make people feel like they’re in control by keeping interactive elements familiar
and predictable... (emphasis added)
A consistent app implements familiar standards
and paradigms by using system-provided interface elements, well-known icons, standard text
styles, and uniform terminology. The app incorporates features and behaviors in ways people
expect.4
In Microsoft’s “Windows Dev Center,” there is an
article titled “The Fluent Design System for Windows app creators.” Here are some pointers from this
article:
An experience feels intuitive when it behaves the
way the user expects it to. By using established
controls and patterns and taking advantage of
platform support for accessibility and globalization, you create an effortless experience…
Fluent experiences use controls and patterns
consistently, so they behave in ways the user has
learned to expect.5
Throughout the guidelines for both companies, the
recurring terms describing a well-designed UI include:
predictable, expected, familiar, fluent, effortless, and
intuitive. These are all different ways of describing
the features that cue for the sense of agency. It is no
secret: our devices are designed to make us feel as if
we are in control.
To be clear, I am not suggesting that these strategies are formulated by malicious managers with the
deliberate intention of creating an illusion of agency.
In defense of these two corporations, there are other
justifications for these design features apart from
cueing the sense of agency, such as, most obviously,
user satisfaction. Nobody likes to use an annoying
app. But even without a mens rea in Silicon Valley,
the outcome remains the same: the design features
on apps today maximize the likelihood that users will
feel a sense of agency while engaged with the device.

4

Both quotations were accessed on March 13, 2020 at https://
developer.apple.com/design/human-interface-guidelines/ios/
overview/themes/
5
https://  d ocs.  m icro  s oft.  c om/  e n-  u s/  w indo ws/  a pps/  f luent-
design-system Accessed on March 13, 2020.
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These design features are embraced by Apple and
Microsoft but they are also well-established in the
educational literature on human–computer interaction, where the empowerment of the human user is
more of an explicit commitment. For example, one
college textbook on UI design lists eight golden rules.
The seventh rule is that the UI should “support an
internal locus of control” because users “strongly
desire the sense that they are in charge of the system” [52]. In a recent article on the sense of agency
in the human–computer interface, this rule is cited
with approval as the authors suggest that the incorporation of techniques from cognitive neuroscience
“will encourage the HCI researcher to consider the
sense of agency as a quantifiable experience in future
research” ([53]: 1). These authors focus on the important question of maintaining feelings of user responsibility by the use of cues that generate the sense
of agency. Along with user responsibility, future
research might also address closely related questions
about the illusion of agency in the human–computer
interface, as I indicate below in "Consequences and
Solutions".
No Supervision
Let us now bring together the various points made
so far. Awareness of the device in one’s personal
space automatically triggers various schemata along
the horizontal stream that are involved with using
the device (see The Supervisory-Inhibition Model
of Action). When those schemata activate the motor
routine, we engage with our device and are presented
with affordances in the digital environment that continue to trigger motor responses. The device can
deliver pleasing stimuli from cyberspace without any
particular intention from the user, which means that
we can have sustained engagement without any need
of intentional supervision from the vertical thread.
Since the sense of agency is fragile (see Illusions
of Agency) and the device is designed to generate
cues for the sense of agency (see Two Mechanisms
for Generating the Sense of Agency and Agency by
Design), this sort of engagement is accompanied by
an illusory sense of agency.
Importantly, the scenario that I have just sketched
is one in which there is no intentional supervision.
Thus, my suggestion is that our sense of agency is
Vol:. (1234567890)
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likely to be illusory when we engage our devices
without a particular intention or goal, or, in terms of
the Norman and Shallice model, without supervision
from the vertical thread. To be clear, there are surely
many instances of engagement with our devices that
do involve particular intentions. One might engage
with one’s phone only in order to access some particular bit of information, such as the weather forecast, and then disengage once the information is
obtained. There is no reason to suspect an illusion of
agency in those cases. But the risk of illusory agency
does arise in the times that we engage without specific intentions. In those times, our actions may be
driven largely by the device yet still accompanied by
a sense of agency. In this section of the article, I will
present some of the research suggesting that users
engage their devices quite frequently without particular intentions or goals, without vertical supervision. This research indicates that the conditions for
the occurrence of an illusory sense of agency are not
uncommon.
Most of the evidence that we have about the motivations for engaging with mobile devices have come
from self-report using questionnaires. These questionnaires tend to focus on problematic or addictive use of the smartphone, but there is currently no
consensus definition for such use in the literature
– a recent review found 78 different scales that have
been used to identify problematic use over the past
13 years [54]. Despite methodological differences,
a clear result that emerges across the studies is that
users most often do not engage their devices with particular goals in mind.
The most common reason given for heavy use of
smartphones is to engage the device in hope of some
sort of emotional gain [55]. The emotional gain typically takes the form of alleviating states with negative
valence such as fear of missing out or FoMO [56–58],
boredom [59], or loneliness [56]. One study found
escapism to be a main motivation for problematic
use [60]. Another common way of using the smartphone without any particular intention is found in the
practice of “phubbing,” which is “the act of snubbing
others in social interactions and instead focusing on
one’s smartphone” [69]. In all of these cases, the reason given for using the device is not to achieve some
particular goal in the particular way that one uses the
device. Instead, the reason is to change or alleviate or
avoid some undesirable state in real life, as it were.
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Since there is no specific goal in using the device, just
the general goals listed above that can be met in any
number of ways, there seems to be little requirement
for intentional supervision.
One shortcoming of standard methodologies
such as the self-report questionnaire is that they lack
insight into the user’s context when engaging the
device, into what the user may have been doing prior
to and during engagement. Heitmayer and Lahlou
[61] have deployed a method of Subjective EvidenceBased Ethnography (SEBE) in order to overcome this
shortcoming as well as to gain additional detail from
the participants about their intentions. This approach
involves collecting first-person video of user engagement with the device in their daily lives through a
small camera mounted on eyeglasses. The participants are interviewed about their engagement based
on the video and the interview is followed by qualitative analysis of the data. In their study, Heitmayer
and Lahlou found participants to be surprised at the
frequency with which they pick up their phones.
Importantly for our purposes here, they also found
that users engaged with their phones out of habit and
not with specific intentions in mind.
Heitmayer and Lahlou summarize a main finding
a follows:
Overall, picking up the phone seems to be
widely automatic and habitualized, with participants often ending up with their phone in hand
without intending to do so, or longer than they
had originally intended. In this context, all but
two of our [37] participants mentioned that they
felt they spent too much time on their phones.
([61]: 5)
This summary is based upon three findings. First, participants demonstrate habitual engagement with their
devices, with one participant reporting that grabbing the
smartphone feels as automatic as covering one’s mouth
when coughing (ibid.). Second, even when participants
do have a specific intention in engaging with the phone,
most of the time they end up disregarding or even forgetting this original intention. Instead, the participants find
themselves caught “in a loop” in which they spend much
more time engaged than originally intended. As one participant reports:
Probably wanted to check the weather or something like this and I usually go on Instagram or
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Facebook. I pick it up for something, then I forget what I wanted to do and check all the things,
my routine, and then I remember, ah yeah, I
wanted to check the weather. (ibid.)
This report suggests a lack of intentional supervision
by the participant. The third finding is that nearly
all of the participants exhibited “fidgeting” behavior
with their phones such as opening and closing apps
without any reason at all. Some reported “that fidgeting with apps on the touchscreen felt relaxing or therapeutic” (ibid.). Taken together, these three results
all reveal patterns of engagement with smartphones
that lack specific intentions, and that therefore lack
inhibitory supervision from the vertical thread.6 Such
patterns of behavior fit well with the claim that our
devices have been intentionally designed to reinforce
continuous repeated engagement [63]. The long-term
repeated engagement found by Heitmayer and Lahlou
is especially concerning for illusions of agency in
light of evidence that features of the sense of agency
can be transferred from voluntary actions to involuntary movements through associative learning [64].
The suggestion that there is a lack of inhibitory
control in excessive smartphone users also finds support from evidence at the neurophysiological level.
Chen et al. (72) recorded event-related potential
(ERP) in subjects during a Go/NoGo task. The task
requires the inhibition of actions (pressing a button)
in response to visual cues. They found that subjects
who used smartphones excessively showed a neural
response during this task that suggests “general deficits in the early stage of inhibitory control” ([72]: 6).
Consider the sorts of behavior described here
in comparison with Environmental Dependency Syndrome, encountered above in "Illusions of Agency." Patients with Environmental
6

It is important to note the possible difference in time scale
when making comparisons between first-person reports, on one
hand, and the experimental evidence on the sense of agency,
on the other. First-person reporting on reasons for one’s own
behavior of the sort discussed here may be formulated, at least
in part, on the basis of long-term personal narrative [62]. In
contrast, many of the experiments cited above in "Two Mechanisms for Generating the Sense of Agency" focus on smaller
time scales of seconds or less. Future experimental work on
the sense of agency under ecologically valid conditions, perhaps with the help of immersive technology, may offer ways
to bridge this temporal gap. I thank an anonymous referee for
raising this concern.
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Dependency Syndrome are unable to form intentions due to frontal lobe damage and they act
without attentional supervision from the vertical
thread. The patients lack genuine agency because
they lack the ability to form intentions that depart
from the affordances of their immediate environment. Perhaps we might conceptualize the patterns of habitual unsupervised smartphone use
that have been presented here as a form of Digital
Environmental Dependency Syndrome (DEDS).
When we engage devices without the sorts of
intentions that can inhibit acting upon affordances,
then our swipes and clicks are merely reactions to
the digital environment. Without the right sort of
intentions, such behavior is not genuine agency,
although it is nonetheless accompanied by the
sense of agency.
Consequences and Solutions
I have made the case that illusory agency is not an
uncommon occurrence for at least some subset of
the billions of smartphone users on the planet today.
Now I will conclude the article with two questions
that are raised by my claim. I will offer initial answers
to these questions but must leave a full discussion for
future work.
The first question is: so what? Why should anyone
care about illusory agency during smartphone use?
Someone inclined not to care about this result might
point out that users often have the general intention of
engaging with their devices with no particular intention, of “mindlessly scrolling” deliberately as a form
of recreation. Perhaps we just enjoy having the illusion of agency that smartphones offer and what is the
problem with that?
While acknowledging the value of personal liberty to engage the device “mindlessly,” there are
strong reasons to care about this phenomenon,
reasons that arise out of a consideration of the
possible consequences of widespread illusions
of agency as well as the threat to human dignity
raised by the illusion itself. Begin by considering
the consequences. Recall the case made by Zuboff
[1] that we are being deliberately manipulated
through our devices. With illusions of agency, that
manipulation is even more dangerous because the
illusion masks the extent of external control. If we
Vol:. (1234567890)
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combine Zuboff’s claims with the argument of this
article, then we have a situation in which a large
subset of the billions of smartphone users on the
planet are being actively manipulated with precision while retaining the feeling as if they are in
complete control. A first step in resisting manipulation is to realize that one is the target of manipulation. Illusions of agency can prevent users from
having that realization. The consequence of such
a scenario is a decreased ability for users to resist
the various behavioral modification projects targeting them on a massive scale – projects that
might range from nudges towards purchasing a
sandwich to nudges towards taking up arms.
In addition to the behavioral consequences of
widespread illusions of agency, one might also raise
a concern by appealing to the dignity and well-being
of the user. Sustained illusions of agency prevent personal growth and self-knowledge. A consequence of
behavioral manipulation might be that one is being
used as a puppet, but illusions of agency add the
additional trouble that one is incapable of realizing
that one is being used as a puppet. The illusion itself
undermines the human project of self-understanding,
a project that ought to be facilitated, not impaired.
The second question that arises from my main
thesis is as follows: what should we do about it?
There are at least three different domains in which
we might respond to the likelihood of illusions of
agency in human–computer interaction: research,
education, and regulation. Let us start with
research. The case that I have made here raises
three general groups of questions that can and
should be investigated through empirical research.
Such investigation may open a path to developing
software applications that mitigate against illusions of agency. A first group of questions have to
do with detecting occurrences of the illusion. For
instance, apart from a first-person report about a
lack of intention, are there measures that reveal
the user to be experiencing an illusion of agency?
That is, are there measures that correlate strongly
with self-reports of lack of supervisory inhibition
while experiencing a sense of agency? Candidates
here might be the types of apps being used and
the duration of their use, the length of the session during which the user is engaged with the
device, or perhaps even the fine details of the finger motions that serve as input. Biomarkers such
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as eye-tracking, electroencephalogram (EEG), and
functional near-infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS)
may be useful as well. This line of research might
offer a way to estimate the prevalence of illusions
of agency among users. The research may also
support design of an app to detect that the user is
likely to be suffering an illusion of agency. Such
an app could notify users of this likelihood when
it occurs and perhaps nudge them to consider their
intention while engaging the device. Parents could
set this app to suspend the device when children
are experiencing illusions of agency.
A second group of questions for research has to
do with the actions that users perform while under
the illusion of agency. Without intentional supervision, do users tend to engage mostly in more “passive” activities such as consuming news or information from social media? Or, alternatively, are there
instances of more active engagement such as making
a significant purchase or (re-)posting some message
with social impact? In connection with the article by
Limerick et al. [53] cited above, do we find a lower
sense of responsibility for actions performed while
experiencing the illusion compared against actions
performed under clear and conscious supervisory
inhibition? This line of research will be important in
order to gauge the extent to which illusions of agency
pose a threat to human autonomy.
A third group of questions surrounds the newly
proposed Digital Environmental Dependency Syndrome (DEDS). Is it fruitful to characterize the use
habits of some individuals as exhibiting this syndrome? If so, is it a chronic condition for specific
individuals or does DEDS perhaps manifest transiently across the general population? Are there factors (emotional, environmental, choice of hardware
or software) that place individuals at higher risk for
DEDS? If we can identify chronic cases of DEDS,
what are some initial strategies for treatment?
In conjunction with responses that involve
further research, the second domain in which
one might respond to the illusions of agency in
human–computer interaction is education, both
for the general public and in educational settings.
One important message for the general public is
that illusions of agency are possible and are likely

16

to be generated by smartphones in virtue of the
ways in which apps are designed. In the context of
formal education, it will be important to teach students about the possibility of illusions of agency
in technology and to equip them with the skills to
avoid it. Students should learn that engaging with
their devices without clear intentions may give the
control of their actions over to the device.
The third domain in which one might respond to
the claim of this article is through state regulation.
Of course, the tension between regulation and
technological innovation is currently a large, controversial, and important topic of discussion [65].
While I will not engage with this discussion here,
I do suggest that illusions of agency should be
included for consideration in the regulatory context of existing technology, such as smartphones,
as well as emerging technology, such as immersive social virtual worlds. Technology regulators,
leaders, and activists – indeed, all of us – should
reflect upon the likelihood that a large swath of the
human population today may be suffering systematic illusions about the locus of control for their
own actions during much of their waking lives.
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